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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K. 
DIKEOU, individually and as 
the natural parents and heirs 
of the estate of THEODORE 
"TED" JAMES DIKEOU, deceased, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D., 
JEFFREY S. OSBORN. M.D.. and 
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH, 
dba ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, 
Defendants-Appellee. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appellants are not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations, whose interpretation 
is determinative of the issues on appeal other than the provision 
cited in appellants' opening brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED DR. 
OSBORN'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF DR. 
BUSHNELL, THE DIKEOUS' EXPERT. 
This Court reviews conclusions of law for legal correctness 
and gives no deference to the district court's judgment. Grover v. 
Case No. 930182-CA 
Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
Grover. 839 P.2d 871, 873 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); accord Scharf v. 
BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Dr. Osborn claims that 
an abuse of discretion standard of review should be applied to the 
trial court's decision to strike Dr. Bushnell's affidavit, and 
cites as support In re Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 436 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991); and Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744f 746 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). Both cases involved evidentiary rulings made at trial, 
and are not applicable to evidentiary rulings made in considering 
a motion for summary judgment. Utah cases consistently apply a 
non-deferential standard of review to all aspects of a ruling on 
summary judgment, including evidentiary issues on which the trial 
court might have discretion if the issue were raised at trial. See 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102-03 (Utah 1992). 
Dr. Osborn asserts in his brief that the trial court properly 
struck the affidavit of Dr. Bushnell because 
(1) it failed to demonstrate that the affiant 
was competent and capable to testify as to the 
standard of care required of a cardiologist 
specializing in electrophysiology such as Dr. 
Osborn in this case; (2) the affidavit lacked 
foundation, (3) it was based on hearsay, (4) 
it did not demonstrate the same criteria exist 
for cardiologists and emergency room medicine 
physicians, (5) it was based on speculation, 
and (6) it did not accurately state the evi-
dence from the record. 
(Appellee's Brief p. 30.) None of these conclusions endures 
analysis. 
A. Dr. Bushnell qualifies as an expert witness. 
The first and fourth objections raised by Dr. Osborn are 
essentially identical, and challenge Dr. Bushnell's qualifications 
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to testify concerning Dr. Osborn's malpractice. Utah law ordinar-
ily requires expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases to 
practice medicine in the same field as the physician against whom 
they testify. See Burton v. Youncrblood, 711 P. 2d 245, 248 (Utah 
1985) . This rule has an exception. An expert witness may 
competently testify upon laying sufficient foundation to demon-
strate that the expert's field of medical practice and the defend-
ant's share a method of treatment—and thus, a standard of care. 
See id.; accord Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993). 
Dr. Bushnell's affidavit fits within this exception. The 
district court incorrectly focused on whether Dr. Bushnell belongs 
to the same field of medical practice as Dr. Osborn. (R. 341) . 
Plaintiffs' primary complaint against Dr. Osborn centers on his 
decision not to personally examine Ted Dikeou on the night of 
February 20-21, 1990. (See R. 5; Appellants' Br. at 12-13). So the 
more accurate question is whether Dr. Bushnell can demonstrate 
enough "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," Utah 
R. Evid. 702, regarding the relationship between emergency room 
physicians and primary physicians to competently testify whether 
Dr. Osborn failed to meet the applicable standard of care when he 
failed to treat Ted Dikeou personally. (See R. 156-60). Dr. 
Bushnell's training as a specialist in emergency room medicine (R. 
233, 239-40) amply qualifies him to speak on that question as an 
expert. (See R. 235.) The relevant standard of care has nothing to 
do with methods of treatment unique to cardiology or electrophysi-
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ology. Instead it has to do with a set of methods and duties with 
which Dr. Bushnell and Dr. Osborn are equally familiar: the 
relationship between a primary physician whose patient has checked 
into a hospital and the emergency room physician who must treat 
him. Because Dr. Bushnell's affidavit demonstrates a sufficient 
foundation of expertise in this area of common experience, skill, 
and training, it fits within a recognized exception to the general 
rule. See Burton v. Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). In 
this case, Dr. Bushnell does not need to practice cardiology to 
qualify as an expert. 
B. Dr. Bushnell's affidavit contains sufficient foundation 
to survive a motion to strike. 
To survive a motion for summary judgment, experts' affidavits 
must contain "factual support for the experts' conclusions.11 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 103 (Utah 1992) (emphasis 
added). 
Dr. Bushnell noted the specific factual grounds on which he 
based his opinions: 
8. I have reviewed the medical records 
on Theodore James "Ted" Dikeou from the pri-
vate practice of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and 
from St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room for 
the treatment rendered to Ted Dikeou on the 
night of February 20-21, 1990. 
9. I have also read transcripts of the 
depositions of Mrs. Helen Dikeou, Dr. Jeffrey 
S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D. Dowdall. 
10. Having read and studied the docu-
ments listed above, I have formed a profes-
sional opinion as to the standard of medical 
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itself admits, Dr. Bushnell's reliance on medical records and 
deposition testimony is legally permitted. 
D. Paragraphs 11-2 3 of Dr. Bushnell's affidavit are neither 
speculative nor factually incorrect. 
An expert witness may rely on data "of a type reasonably 
relied on by experts in the witness's field of expertise," Barson 
v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984), and he is 
qualified to testify by reason of his "knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education . . . ." Utah R. Evid. 702. Without 
belaboring the point, Dr. Bushnell's affidavit evinces his careful 
reading of the record and his long experience with emergency room 
medicine. To the extent Dr. Bushnell makes inferences, they are 
based on the same experience and training that qualify him to 
testify at all. It would be contrary both to law and good policy 
to ask an expert witness to state his opinions without making the 
kinds of inferences that his experience equips him to make. That 
Dr. Bushnell's conclusions rely on such inferences is the natural 
product of his work as an expert. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHEN THERE REMAIN GENUINE ISSUES OP 
MATERIAL FACT. 
Summary judgment should be granted only when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact, and an appellate court reviews a 
grant of summary judgment for legal correctness, giving the dis-
trict court no particular deference. See Transamerica Cash 
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Resei ^ .. - Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 21# 25-26 
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night of February 2 0-21, 1990, Ted Dikeou's unusual arrhythmia, and 
Dr. Osborn's response. 
13. Dr. Osborn was aware of the unique nature of this 
occurrence, and by his own testimony noted that this 
prolonged episode warranted further testing, investiga-
tion and treatment of Ted Dikeou's prolonged tachycardia-
-a presentation made gravely ominous by Ted's known 
diagnosis of Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome. This is the 
standard of medical care which applies to Dr. Jeffrey 
Osborn. 
(R. 234) (emphasis added). By this sentence Dr. Bushnell means 
that Dr. Osborn's physician-patient relationship with Ted Dikeou, 
combined with Dr. Osborn's awareness of the unusual threat posed by 
Mr. Dikeou's tachycardia, obligated Dr. Osborn to pursue "further 
testing, investigation and treatment . . . ." (Id.) The duty of a 
primary physician to personally treat his or her patient is well-
recognized: 
A physician, in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, is, during the existence of the relationship of 
physician and patient, under a duty to give to the 
patient all necessary care as long as the case requires 
attention, and an unwarranted lack of diligence in 
attending the patient after assumption of the case for' 
treatment renders the physician liable for damages. The 
courts are in general agreement that this principle 
properly states the test of care to be applied in 
determining a physician's liability for lack of diligence 
in attending a patient. 
C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Liability of Physician for Lack of 
Diligence in Attending Patient, 57 A.L.R.2d 379, 388 (1958). 
Dr. Bushnell's affidavit squarely states that Dr. Osborn 
breached this standard of care. 
Despite his professional relationship with Ted 
Dikeou and his awareness that further action on his part 
was required, Dr. Osborn failed to appreciate the 
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seriousness of this occurrence, failed to investigate the 
change in his patient's symptoms, failed to recommend 
that Ted Dikeou meet him at the hospital where Dr. Osborn 
has staff privileges and in general, failed to respond in 
any manner to his patient's condition. 
•-•tfii testimony verifies this version of 
events, albeit > < k. 156-60). 
natura i i \ attempte-. to dt'tenil i uiai ! i in 
Wher luii- u ersona? examine Ted Dikeou and 
prescribe something more app: .
 r i. 'Verapamil, n/ osborn 
replied, ,l" 1 would not feel comfortable go i nq *.'j ' . M.n'k ! "I 
doing LI ' -vileges." (R. 160) » i 
Bushnell?:'^ a* i *u ,^  , t demolishes Rased cm his training 
in emergency medicin* liicc - Bushne . e 
response-. 3 uxaxi -".if! privileges 
at St Mar? -« Hospital preventea ; in 
l^rson: \ i • Hospital wouiu n-iv. "undoubtedly d 
Dr. Osborn asked 
patient (Id.) • „ 
emergency room physician, Dr. Owvi 
r ^  requested that Ted [Dikeou] 
be t ransferrc hospita. " 1 I 
.'i'"'), I 1 Osborn couln ti.iv^ insisted that Dr. Dowda 1 i consti i" • 
with the < - / au :?"k's HospitaJ before 
treating Tc : Dikeou arther (see I event, 
himseli admitted that si Mark*r- Hospital let iim see 
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Ted Dikeou and review Ted's records three days later1, (See R. 235-
36, 160). This admission and the existence of feasible alterna-
tives leave Dr. Osborn without a defense for his inaction on the 
night of February 20-21, 1990. Dr. Osborn breached his standard of 
care. 
B. The affidavit establishes causation. 
Dr. Osborn claims as an aside in his brief that plaintiffs' 
failed to establish the element of causation. (Appellee's Brief 
pp. 27-28.) Dr. Bushnell's affidavit also states the key element 
of causation. "Dr. Osborn suggested the administration of medica-
tion to Ted Dikeou that night [of February 20-21, 1990] without 
confirming the condition for which he was prescribing, thereby 
playing a major role in the exacerbation of Ted's condition and his 
subsequent cardiac arrest, coma and death." (R. 235). 
Dr. Bushnell's statement that Dr. Osborn prescribed medication 
"without confirming the condition for which he was prescribing" 
means that Dr. Osborn's failure to personally examine Ted Dikeou 
caused Ted Dikeou's death. (See id.). Dr. Osborn has admitted that 
he would have prescribed something different than Verapamil if he 
would have known Dr. Dowdall's diagnosis of paroxysmal atrial 
*Dr. Osborn self-servingly characterizes this visit as only a 
social visit, but does not deny that he review Ted Dikeou's medical 
chart while there. (Appellee's brief p. 3 6.) Mr. Dikeou account 
of that occasion is that Dr. Osborn both "examined Ted" and "spent 
some time talking to us about his condition as he saw it." (R. 
162.) Mr. Dikeou's version obviously controls for purposes of 
summary judgment. 
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tachycardia (PAT) was incorrect. "Hypothetically, if he [Dr. 
Dowdall] had mentioned atrial fibrillation my response for 
treatment would be—have been different than Verapamil." (R. 160). 
By this statement Dr. Osborn admits that his failure to examine Ted 
Dikeou personally led to the misprescription of Verapamil, which in 
turn led to Ted Dikeou's early death. 
Also, by "exacerbation," Dr. Bushnell clearly refers to 
causation. Ted Dikeou had Wolff-Parkinson-White (WPW) syndrome 
(See R. 157) , a cardiac disorder that can be controlled with proper 
treatment. (See R. 155.) When Dr. Bushnell refers to Dr. Osborn's 
inaction as "exacerbating" Ted Dikeou's condition, a reasonable 
inference is that he means that the misprescription of Verapamil 
exacerbated Ted Dikeou's WPW syndrome. (See R. 234-35). This 
statement establishes the necessary element of causation, linking 
Dr. Osborn's breach of his standard of care with Ted Dikeou7s 
death. 
Given these statements from Dr. Bushnell7s affidavit, which 
this Court must construe in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, 
there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to Dr. Osborn's 
role in Ted Dikeou's untimely death. The district court erred when 
it granted summary judgment. 
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POINT III 
THE DIKEOUS DID NOT ADMIT THAT ONLY A CARDIOL-
OGIST COULD TESTIFY CONCERNING THE STANDARD OP 
CARE APPLICABLE TO DR. OSBORN. 
Both in its minute entry of April 17, 1992 and its summary 
judgment of May 8, 1992, the district court said that the Dikeous 
had "patently admitted that they have no expert to provide 
testimony necessary to show that Dr. Osborn's involvement in the 
treatment of the decedent . • . did not rise to the standard 
required under Utah law in order for plaintiffs [the Dikeous] to 
sustain their burden of proof." (R. 341; R. 288) Dr. Osborn 
repeats this charge on appeal. 
[P]laintiffs admitted under oath that plaintiffs believed 
that the interrogatory concerning the substance of the 
allegation against Dr. Osborn was "best answered by a 
medical expert in the field of cardiology, and in 
response [attach] a copy of a letter opinion from Michael 
D. Lesh, M.D., a cardiologist contacted by Plaintiff's 
attorney." 
(Appellee's Br. at 37-38). 
the passage that Dr. Osborn quotes should be considered in 
context. It occurs in Plaintiff Helen K. Dikeou's Answers to 
Defendant Osborn's Interrogatories. The interrogatory and the 
relevant part of Ms. Dikeou's answer appear below: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: With reference to paragraph 20 
of plaintiff's complaint, please state each and every 
fact or basis upon which it is claimed that; (a) Dr. 
Osborn was negligent in that he failed to properly 
ascertain the true condition of the patient; (b) that he 
failed personally to examine the patient and satisfy 
himself concerning the diagnosis of Dr. Dowdall; (c) that 
he mis-prescribed the medication to be given; and (d) 
that he failed to promptly and properly respond to the 
adverse conditions that developed to the patient after 
12 
hospital personnel followed his diagnosis and doctor's 
orders. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory as 
it requires Plaintiff to make medical judgments beyond 
the scope of her education, training and expertise. 
Plaintiff believes that this Interrogatory is Jbest 
answered by a medical expert in the field of cardiology, 
and in response, attaches a copy of a letter opinion from 
Michael D. Lesh, M.D., a cardiologist contacted by 
Plaintiff's attorneys to evaluate the care given to 
Theodore "Ted" Dikeou, and which opinion will be supple-
mented hereafter. 
(R. 305-06) (emphasis added). 
On its face, Ms. Dikeou's statement cannot be taken to mean 
what the district court and Dr. Osborn say it means. "Best 
answered" does not mean "can only be answered." The first phrase 
indicates a preference, the second a requirement. A fair reading 
of Ms. Dikeou7s statement shows that she preferred Dr. Osborn to 
rely on Dr. Lesh's letter rather than on her lay opinion. To 
construe Ms. Dikeou's preference as an admission that she has no 
case without a cardiologist requires logic that not only leads, but 
leaps. 
Besides, even if Ms. Dikeou had clearly said that she thought 
she needed a cardiologist to make out her prima facie case, her 
statement should not have affected the court's decision. Courts 
have discretion to admit expert witness testimony based on the law, 
not on a lay person's opinion. The district court erred if it 
permitted its misreading of Ms. Dikeou's statement to influence its 
decision to strike Dr. Bushnell's affidavit. 
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POINT IV 
DOCKETING STATEMENTS NEED NOT CONTAIN ALL 
ISSUES THAT APPELLANTS RAISE IN THEIR BRIEF. 
An appellant waives any issue not raised in his or her 
appellate brief. See Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 n.4 
(Utah 1992). This rule, while reasonable and necessary when 
applied to briefs, is unduly harsh if applied to docketing state-
ments. Docketing statements serve five chief purposes. They help 
the appellate and supreme courts assign cases to the proper court, 
decide when cases ought to be certified to the supreme court, 
classify cases to accurately determine their priority, grant 
summary dispositions when proper, and make calendar assignments. 
See Utah R. App. P. 9. Given the 21-day time period within which 
to file docketing statements, id. , requiring appellants to list all 
issues serves neither the purposes for which docketing statements 
are required nor the appellants, whose rushed attempt to provide a 
complete catalogue of issues probably would result in poor 
lawyering. 
Dr. Osborn relies In Re Estate of Justheim, 824 P. 2d 432 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) , to support his argument that the Dikeous/ issue has 
been untimely presented. There this Court understandably refused 
to review an issue that had been presented neither to the trial 
court, nor in the docketing statement, nor in the principal brief. 
Id. at 437. In fact, the court determined that the party trying to 
present the issue for its review had waived the issue at trial. Id. 
14 
The facts of Justheim differ from the facts of this case in 
nearly every detail. The Dikeous challenged the lower court's 
grant of Dr. Osborn's motion for filing of discovery responses. (R. 
346-50). While they did not list that issue in their docketing 
statement, they raised and discussed it in their principal brief to 
this Court. (See Appellants' Br. at 19-20). Finally, because this 
case was decided on the memoranda, see R. 287-89, 340-42, the 
Dikeous had no trial at which to waive the issue they have 
presented for review. Justheim does not apply, given these facts. 
This Court should disregard Dr. Osborn's argument and review 
the lower court's decision to supplement the record three weeks 
after it granted summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order striking Dr. 
Bushnell's affidavit, vacate the summary judgment, and remand the 
case for a jury trial on the merits. 
DATED this 2<g ** day of August, 1993. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: ./ 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSElP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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